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Abstract 
The demands on maritime operations today are increasingly higher in terms of control, 
efficiency and cost. The margins for accidents and security incidents are therefore 
decreasing. In the area of ship safety the regulations, guidelines and methods have a 
history and culture of systematic research, development and implementation. In 
contrast, international security is highly politicized and therefore not as transparent. 
The result is that a tradition of ship security is not as well established. 
The overall aim of this thesis is to propose a method for ship security analysis that 
increases the overall safety of the crew and the ship. The objective is to develop a 
method that is systematic in order to ensure that assessment and response are 
complete and effective, and that the process is documented to provide evidence of 
decision-making. 
The method used is probabilistic risk assessment where quantitative analysis is central. 
The proposed approach is consistent with the requirements of maritime safety work. 
However, in the work here, the proposed methods are specifically tested for security 
cases. This is because hazards (without intent) and threats (with intent) evolve in 
different ways into risk. Therefore, they must be analysed differently in order to 
capture the causal relationship. 
The proposed approach consists of three steps: the first step consists of a threat 
description that documents qualitative and quantitative aspects that together describe 
how the threat most likely will act in relation to the ship’s vulnerability; the second step 
uses the threat description to define the system studied as well as the scenarios that 
collectively describe the harmful consequences; the third step evaluates the risk with 
tools from probabilistic risk assessment. 
The overall conclusion is that the proposed method brings the procedure and results of 
ship security analysis into the open and therefore allows for criticism, improvements 
and shared risk knowledge, not possible with less structured methods. The results also 
show that the calculated probabilities agree with available statistics, which indicates 
that the analysis succeeds in describing the central causal relationships of the scenarios 
modelled. 
Keywords: naval ship, piracy, risk-based, risk control options, ship security analysis. 
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1 Introduction 
There have always been hazards at sea, both traditional safety hazards, such as the 
possibility of grounding, and security threats such as piracy. As shipping and society 
changes, the threat also changes. In this work there is a difference between the terms 
safety and security. The term security is used here only in relation to external 
antagonistic threats and security is, therefore, achieved when the ship is protected from 
such threats. Safety, on the other hand is achieved when the ship is designed, manned 
and equipped to reduce the possibility of hazards (without intent) leading to harm. 
This work is about understanding the threat, and how to find the most effective 
measures to reduce the harmful effect of any threat, i.e. ship security analysis. 
Shipping and ships represent great monetary as well as symbolic value and can 
therefore be the target of security threats such as robbery, piracy or terrorist attack. 
The purpose of naval ships is to protect (offensively and defensively) national interests 
against threats during war or other types of crisis. Therefore, for both civilian and 
naval ships there is a need to analyse the threat and reduce the possible harmful effects 
of an attack. This work studies security analysis for both civilian and naval ships. Ship 
security analysis lacks a tradition of research and development and there is therefore a 
need for further development (McNaught, 2005 and Mitropoulos, 2004). 
1.1 Ship security 
Total security of a ship can never be achieved. Hence, the efforts focus on reducing 
possible risks that affect security. Different measures, or risk control options, to reduce 
risks are often interconnected with each other and it is not possible to change these 
measures without affecting other aspects of the security, safety or effectiveness of the 
system. Security, as well as safety, is therefore a matter of compromise. 
Civilian ships’ security measures are often the first and only measures preventing 
criminal acts at sea. The International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) code 
regulates ship security. The code was developed in the aftermath of the terrorist 
attacks in USA on September 11th, 2001. The development started two months after 
the attacks and the final code was presented only 13 months later (Wengelin, 2012). 
The fast process meant that the development was characterized by it being better to 
have something imperfect rather than nothing at all (Mitropoulos, 2004). See Paper III 
for further details on the ISPS code. 
Security is crucial to successful military planning and actions (NATO Standardization 
Agency, 2007). Security is achieved when you take measures to protect your forces. 
Appropriate security allows for freedom of action by reducing your vulnerability to 
your enemy’s actions (DCDC, 2010, NATO Standardization Agency, 2007 and 
University of Cincinnati, 2004). Security is therefore an important measure of success 
for naval ships. See Paper I and II for further discussions. In this work, survivability is 
seen as one of the most important properties for a naval ship in terms of achieving 
security. Both security and survivability are not only a function of technology, but also 
tactics and efforts carried out onboard, see more detailed discussion in Papers I and II. 
In the Malmö Declaration the participants at the International Conference on Piracy at 
Sea (ICOPAS 2011) political, industry and research representatives called on the 
international community to enhance cooperation between national and international 
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actors in combating piracy and other violent crimes at sea (WMU, 2011). One example 
of such cooperation, discussed during the conference, is to use both civilian and 
military experience to further develop the risk-based ship security that the declaration 
calls on companies to perform (WMU, 2011). 
1.2 Risk management 
Risk management and its components, such as risk assessment and risk analysis, have 
been employed since the 1950s for the control of major accident hazards in areas such 
as space travel and industrial plants. Risk management is defined here as the 
systematic application of management policies, procedures and practices to the task of 
analysing, evaluating and controlling risk. Risk management is often defined by the 
following activities: 
A. Risk analysis including scope or system definition, hazard identification and risk 
estimation. 
B. Risk evaluation including risk tolerability decisions and analysis of options. 
C. Risk reduction and control including decision making, implementation and 
monitoring. (DCDC, 2010, IACS, 2004, IEC, 1995 and Kuo, 2007). 
Risk assessment is defined here as consisting of steps A and B from the list above and 
risk is defined as a function of the probability of the occurrence of an 
unexpected/unwanted event and the consequence of it happening. See also Figure 1 for 
an illustration of risk management and its components and sub-components. 
 
Figure 1. Risk management and its components. 
The results of risk analysis must always be weighed against both risk tolerability levels 
and other operational parameters, such as financial considerations, requested 
reliability and possible operational gain. Generally, higher risks are tolerable if the 
possible operational gain is high (IACS, 2004 and NATO Standardization Agency, 
2007). 
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2 Objective and motivation 
The demands on maritime operations today are increasingly higher in terms of control, 
efficiency and cost. The margins for accidents and security incidents are therefore 
decreasing. At the same time there are increasing levels of conflict in highly populated 
coastal areas. In these areas, there are busy sea-lanes and the conflicts place new 
security demands on both civilian and naval ships (Department of Defence, 2007). An 
example of such an area is the waters off Somalia studied in Paper III.  
In the area of maritime safety the regulations, guidelines and methods have a history 
and culture of systematic research, development and implementation (Kuo, 2007). In 
contrast international security is highly politicized and therefore not as transparent 
(Wengelin, 2012). The result is that a tradition of ship security is not as well established 
(McNaught, 2005). Therefore, there is a need for further research and applied 
development of methods and tools. This development must be able to handle the new 
and more complex demands on ship security for both civilian and naval ships 
(Department of Defence, 2007 and McNaught, 2005). Being able to understand and 
describe the risk of activities important to our way of life, such as sea transport, is also 
an important intellectual tool on its own. This tool can then be used to support an 
innovative and sustainable development of our society. 
To capture the need for further development, the work in Papers I to III studies ship 
operations with additional hazards beyond the typical safety hazards. Such hazards 
could be the result of a military threat to naval vessels (Papers I and II) or the security 
threat posed by pirates to commercial vessels (Paper III). In such operations, the ship, 
crew and operating procedures must also take the security threat into consideration 
when reaching compromises in design and operation. One example of a situation 
where safety must be weighed against security is highlighted in Figure 2. Rough 
weather and pirates: two separate hazards, but also an example where the safety 
hazard (rough weather) is also an effective and low cost risk control option for the 
security hazard (pirates). 
 
Figure 2. Rough weather at sea, a typical safety hazard, is an effective risk control 
option against piracy because the weather affects the pirates’ small boats to a much 
greater extent in than it affects the ships. Illustration: Kajsa Järner. 
The overall aim of this thesis is to propose a method for ship security analysis, which 
aims to increase the overall safety of the crew and the ship. To be able to increase the 
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overall safety, the analysis must facilitate compromises between traditional maritime 
safety and maritime security. The objective is to develop a method that is systematic 
and ensures that assessment and response are complete and effective. It must be 
possible to use the method in future scenarios and thus describe and model the causal 
relationships from threat to risk. The aim has been broken down into three steps, 
chosen to gradually increase the complexity and develop a consistent method base: 
 define the requirements of the analysis process (Papers I and II), 
 test the feasibility of scenario modelling (Papers II and III), and 
 test the feasibility of expert based threat analysis (Papers III). 
2.1 Assumptions 
The traditional engineering approach to risk analysis, as described in sections 1.2 and 3, 
is based on objectivist expected utility, which combines objectivist probabilities with 
objectivist utilities. This means that the probability used is interpreted as an objective 
representation of the frequency and that there is a linear relationship between the 
consequences studied and their utility assignments (Hansson, 1993). The method 
proposed here is based on the assumptions: 
 that objectivist expected utility can be used to describe security risk for ships, and 
 that the result of the analysis can give a reasonable representation of the risk. 
The first assumption above means that probabilities and consequences obtained by the 
analysis are assumed to objectively describe the negative outcomes of the threat. 
According to Hansson, in his research on the philosophy of risk, this can only be the 
case if the following criteria are satisfied: 
1. The decisions options, as well as the system studied, must be finite and defined. 
2. The analysis must be able to identify the negative outcomes of the studied 
hazard. 
3. From the analysis it must be possible to objectively describe the consequences of 
the hazard. 
4. It must be possible to obtain/assess the probabilities with reasonable accuracy. 
5. It must be rational to keep the expected outcome (the risk i.e. the probability 
times the consequence) as low as possible. (Hansson, 1993) and further 
developed in (Hansson, 2012) 
These criteria are seldom fully fulfilled (Hansson, 1993), which is also the case here. 
According to the second assumption above, the result can therefore only be seen as a 
simplified description of the risk. However, based on the discussion below and on 
Hansson’s criteria in relation to the work in Papers I to III, the results are assumed to 
give a reasonable representation of the risk. 
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1. The decisions options, as well as the system studied, must be finite and defined 
The real system and options are never finite. In the work in Papers I to III it is stressed 
that the system and scenarios must be defined and documented and that the definition 
must be easily understood throughout the risk management process. See, for example, 
the discussion on safety culture in relation to risk analysis in Papers I and II. 
2. The analysis must be able to identify the negative outcomes of the studied hazard 
Difficulties in defining consequences must be documented, especially in relation to the 
perception of security, and these difficulties must be thoroughly weighed in risk 
tolerability decisions, analysis of options and risk reduction. For further discussion on 
risk perception see Paper III and Kunreuther’s article on risk analysis for an uncertain 
world (Kunreuther, 2002). 
3. From the analysis it must be possible to objectively describe the consequences of the 
hazard 
The decision maker has the responsibility to weigh different consequences against each 
other, not the analyst, and this work focuses on being able to disclose and document 
the causal relationships from threat to risk under the assumption that such an 
understanding facilitates the risk tolerability decisions and risk reduction. For further 
detail, see discussion on safety culture in Papers I and II. 
4. It must be possible to obtain/assess the probabilities with reasonable accuracy 
How the probabilities has been obtained, reported actual frequencies or expert 
assessment, must be documented and highlighted in the process together with 
uncertainties. The uncertainties must then be taken into account in the decision 
process, see for example the discussion on safety factors in Paper II and robust 
solutions in Paper III. 
5. It must be rational to keep the expected outcome (i.e. the probability times the 
consequence) as low as possible 
For frequently occurring cases, it makes sense to keep the expected outcome to a 
minimum; however, this is not always valid in case-by-case comparisons for hazards 
with low probability. See discussion on measures of effectiveness in Papers I and II and 
on robust solutions in Paper III. 
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3 Method 
Today civilian and military security assessment is often risk-based and therefore has 
the aim of describing security challenges in terms of a risk in the form of consequences 
and their likelihood. However, most of the assessments lack quantitative investigation 
and analysis and are therefore only qualitative (DCDC, 2010, IMO, 2002a, NATO 
Standardization Agency, 2007 and Norwegian Shipowners’ Association, 2008). The 
method of this work is probabilistic risk assessment where quantitative analysis is 
central. 
3.1 General approach 
The purpose of introducing probabilistic risk assessment into the ship security analysis 
is to meet security goals more effectively through a well-balanced combination of 
proactive and reactive measures. This could then be used as input to operational 
planning as well as a systems engineering process for concept development, new-builds 
and midlife upgrades. The aim is to get ships more fitted to their intended use. 
In the approach proposed in the current thesis, the aim is, as often as possible, to use 
quantification of low-level aspects such as aspects of the threat’s capability. The low-
level aspects are then linked to the risk with causal relationships, see Papers II and III 
for further details. The proposed approach is consistent with the requirements for 
maritime safety work. However, the methods proposed here are specifically tested for 
security cases. This is because hazards (without intent) and threats (with intent) evolve 
in different ways into risk; therefore, they must be analysed differently in order to 
capture the causal relationship. There must be particular focus on: 
 the lack of objective data, because each intent has its own set of probabilities, 
 the antagonistic threat, i.e. changes according to intent and ship protection 
methods, and 
 the relation between the operations measure of effectiveness and the risk taken. 
The proposed approach consists of three steps, which all allow stringent 
documentation of the analysis and results. The first step consists of a threat description 
that documents qualitative and quantitative aspects that together describe how the 
threat will act in relation to protection methods and the specific ship. The threat 
analysis is based on expert assessment, but should if possible also be supported by such 
things as empirical measurements and intelligence data. The second step uses the 
threat description to define the system studied as well as the scenarios that collectively 
describe the harmful consequences. The definition should be such that it describes the 
causal relationships involved and is, therefore, also able to describe how a change in 
the threat or protection changes the risk. In the third step the risk is evaluated with 
tools from probabilistic risk assessment. Examples of how the quantitative analysis can 
be documented can be found in Papers II and III. 
The result of the security risk analysis described above is meant to be used as a risk 
knowledge model together with other knowledge models on the same system. Such 
knowledge models could describe safety risks or the system’s effectiveness as a 
function of operational freedom. Based on this comprehensive understanding of the 
system studied, decisions regarding such things as risk control options and alternative 
use of the system can be taken. It must, however, be clear that there will be 
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uncertainties in the outcomes of the analysis, which must be taken into account when 
decisions are taken, see section 2.1. 
In relation to other work performed today, which most often lacks a quantitative 
perspective, the proposed method utilises both qualitative and quantitative  
knowledge. The quantitative aspects allow well-defined ship performance data, such as 
speed, size and sensor performance, to be included into the model. This enables the 
analysis to examine how performance data affects the risk for example to test how ship 
speed affects the probability of successful pirate approach, as shown in Paper III. This 
relationship is not possible to obtain without a quantitative analysis. 
The quantitative aspects, however, make the proposed analysis more demanding than 
the analysis performed today. The benefits are that it is possible to verify and validate 
the results, which means that the analysis can be improved over time. The 
improvements can be a result of lessons from the validation, but also from the fact that 
the input to the threat analysis, system definition or scenario definition, can be 
updated. Such a process enables a discussion on probabilities and facilitates feedback 
to experts on their assessment, which will lead to better assessments in the future. 
3.2 Utilised methods and tools 
Probabilistic risk assessment is, as described in section 5.2, often complex and an audit 
of the assessment is vital to ensure that a logical and consistent approach and relevant 
data has been used. In order to make sure that the risk management process is 
systematic, and thus facilitates a complete and effective response, the studies in Papers 
II and III also make use of the analysis tools presented below. These tools come mostly 
from the areas risk analysis, military force protection, military operations research and 
decision analysis, see Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3. Illustration of generic tools and methods from the areas of Operational 
research (OR), Decision analysis (DA), Force protection (FP) and Risk analysis (RA) 
supporting the risk management process in the appended papers. 
Probabilistic risk assessment 
As described in sections 4 and 5 the development in the area of ship safety is risk-
based. It is reasonable to assume that development in the area of ship security would 
benefit from being consistent with the same fundamental aspects, such as the definition 
9 
of risk and demands for quantification of, for example, scenario probabilities. Such 
consistency would then allow safety risks to be compared with security risk in order to 
find the best compromise. For further details, see Paper I. 
Probabilistic risk assessment is seen here as an approach, which aims to quantify the 
risk in terms of probabilities and consequences. The result is then compared with limits 
set by society and the operator to decide to what extent the process can be defined as 
safe or how the risk can be limited (Andrews & Moss, 2002). See section 5 for further 
discussion. 
Therefore, the work in the appended papers utilises, where possible, the experience 
and requirements defined in the risk-based ship design (Sames, 2009) and International 
Maritime Organisation’s (IMO) formal safety analysis (IMO, 2002b), where the 
procedure is well documented. 
System definition 
A risk analysis must be performed on well-defined scenarios and systems (Hansson, 
1993, IMO, 2002b and Vassalos, 2009). The work in Papers II and III makes use of 
influence diagrams (Shachter, 1988) to define the system. 
Influence diagrams are described by IMO in the Guidelines for formal safety 
assessment (IMO, 2002b), but more thoroughly documented in the area of decision 
analysis. Papers II and III use influence diagrams to model influences and define the 
studied system. 
An influence diagram is a graphical, mathematical representation of the network of 
influences on an event. Influence diagram methodology is derived from decision 
analysis and, according to IMO, is particularly useful in situations for which there may 
be little, or no empirical data available and the approach is capable of identifying all 
the influences and therefore underlying causal information. The influence diagram 
approach described by IMO uses expert judgment to model the network of influences. 
These influences link factors at the operational level with their causes, and with the 
underlying influences (IMO, 2002b and Shachter, 1988). 
A Bayesian network is an influence diagram without the ability to include decision and 
utility nodes (Friis-Hansen, 2000). The work presented in this thesis uses the more 
general term: influence diagrams; however, the term Bayesian networks could have 
been used as well. In the area of maritime safety Bayesian networks have been tested 
in different areas such as tool for cost-optimal inspection planning, a reliability model 
of buckling of pipelines (Friis-Hansen, 2000) and bridge work in a collision scenario 
(Pedersen, 2010). Friis-Hansen’s research on Bayesian networks show that Bayesian 
networks and influence diagrams have many advantages to offer the marine 
community, especially in the area of risk analysis. 
Expert assessment 
Risk analysis is often supported with data from expert assessment due to a lack of 
empirical data on the studied system (IMO, 2002b); this is also the case in this thesis. 
This is because the causal relationships behind the incidents are not described in the 
statistics. Expert assessment of probabilities, however, often lack calibration and can, 
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therefore, have systematic errors (Hansson, 1993). Therefore, the aim here is, as often 
as possible, to have experts assess capabilities of the threat rather than probabilities. 
The assessed capabilities are more easily understood and can, for example, be 
calibrated using measurements or intelligence reports. The assessed capabilities are 
then linked to the risk with the system description and simulations. Paper II discusses 
the possibility of basing the threat analysis on expert assessment and Paper III tests the 
concept on piracy using the threat analysis presented in the Allied joint doctrine for 
force protection (NATO Standardization Agency, 2007). 
In this work, expert assessment is collected through a combination of questionnaires 
and interviews in order to capture both qualitative and quantitative aspects of the 
threat and the interaction with the vulnerability of the ship. For further details, see 
Paper III. 
Simulations of operations 
To capture important aspects of maritime operations a safety scenario is seen here as a 
model of reality to be used when analysing risks associated with the operations studied. 
When setting up the simulation the variables that affect the problem must be defined 
as well as the constraints and limitations. In the simulation there must be particular 
focus on the measures of effectiveness, as they will give guidance on how the simulated 
system will be used and how different alternatives are prioritized (Jaiswal, 1997). 
The simulations must be validated and statistical analysis plays an important role in 
model validation if results of the system operation are available. Military system 
studies and security studies, however, suffer from a lack of historical data and realistic 
experiments can be impossible to perform (Jaiswal, 1997). The model validation is 
therefore often limited to sub-model validation based on statistical data and model 
validation by expert opinion, sensitivity analysis and hypothesis validity, see Paper II 
for further discussion and Paper III for examples of validation based on statistics. 
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4 Regulations for maritime risk management 
There are maritime safety and security regulations and requirements with varying 
degrees of importance and applicability such as international regulations, regional 
regulations, flag state regulations, classification requirements and industry guidance. 
More detailed examples and descriptions are presented in Papers I to III. According to 
the International Association of Classification Societies (IACS), regulations and 
requirements should only be seen as a starting point for ensuring safe and secure 
operation of the ship. The ship operator must, therefore, follow the applicable 
regulations and requirements, but is also responsible for identifying and safeguarding 
against the risks associated with its particular ships, operations and trade. The methods 
applied must be systematic, if assessment and response are to be complete and 
effective, and the process documented to provide evidence of the decision making 
(IACS, 2004). 
4.1 IMO regulations and civilian ships 
Maritime safety regulations developed by the IMO are designed to make sure that 
passengers, cargo, crew, surrounding ships and environment are kept as safe as 
possible (Kuo, 2007). Traditionally the codes were prescriptive in their nature, which 
means that the codes prescribe aspects of design or construction with engineering 
specifications. Prescriptive standards are generally formulated as a result of accidents 
and are suitable for routine activities, but devolve responsibility and innovation and 
are unsuitable for new developments (Kuo, 2007). The IMO Code of safety for high-
speed craft (IMO, 1994) states that for traditional ships it is possible to use a 
prescriptive code and ensure a suitable low risk level. However, for novel or 
specialised types of ship, a prescriptive safety code is too restrictive and probabilistic 
(or risk-based) methods, where the risk for different incidents is kept acceptably low, 
need to be used. Such a probabilistic method uses a series of standardized expressions 
to evaluate events, and events with minor effect are allowed to have a higher 
acceptable probability than an event with hazardous effect. See Papers I and II for 
more details. 
Risk-based approaches have been developed by the IMO since the 1960s. The 
probabilistic damage stability regulation in Safety of Life at Sea from 1974 (SOLAS74) 
was the first risk-based regulation. In 1997, the IMO adopted the Formal Safety 
Assessment as a risk-based approach to rule making (Skjong, 2009). Quantitative risk-
based approaches are thus well established in the area of maritime safety, even though 
such approaches have not yet been developed for all safety areas. 
Risk-based ship design, operation and regulation have, in terms of safety risks, has also 
been the focus of the integrated project SAFEDOR (Sames, 2009) under the 6th 
framework programme of the European Commission. According to SAFEDOR the 
results of risk analysis and other ship performance data should be used as a risk 
knowledge model in design decision making (Vassalos, 2009), in accordance with 
Figure 4. This allows comparison of operational risk with operational gain in design 
decision making. 
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Figure 4. Design decision making in risk-based ship design. Redrawn from Vassalos 
(Vassalos, 2009). 
The first maritime and ship security measures and regulations were developed and 
approved by IMO in 1986 after the terrorist attacks on the cruise ship Achille Lauro. 
However, these measures were only made mandatory by the US, Canada and the UK 
(Wengelin, 2012). Therefore, the ISPS code, introduced in 2002, which regulates ship 
security analysis, is the first regulation with the possibility of affecting ship security 
efforts. The ISPS code can be classified as risk-based, but is described by IMO as a first 
step (Mitropoulos, 2004). 
4.2 Naval ships 
The safety of a ship under attack is the responsibility of the state in question and is not 
governed by international regulations. SOLAS does not apply to “ships of war and 
troopships” (NATO Standardization Agency, 2010). However, a naval ship often 
operates under non-military conditions and civilian maritime safety regulations are 
often applicable for many parts of the ship (James, 2010), for example, see the man 
overboard case highlighted in Figure 5. Today there are a number of classification 
societies that have rules for the classification of naval ships (Simpson, 2010). Det 
Norske Veritas classification rules for naval ships (DNV, 2009) are described in Papers 
I and II. 
 
Figure 5. Should the analysis procedure of risk associated with a man overboard be 
different depending on whether or not it is the result of a safety hazard or security 
threat? Dummy overboard during an exercise testing the war fighting and damage 
control readiness of crews in the Swedish Navy. Photo: Hans Liwång 
The Naval Ship Code (NSC) is a code developed by NATO’s standardisation agency 
(NATO Standardization Agency, 2010). The code is developed for surface naval 
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vessels and other vessels operated by the armed forces or agencies of a state. The NSC, 
which is optional, is based on, and benchmarked against, IMO conventions and 
resolutions. The code does not include measures specifically designed to address the 
effects of military attack. The NSC is goal-based and the ship should be verified against 
the goals during the design and construction stages as well as during operation. See 
Paper I for more details on the structure of the NSC. 
Even though the NSC does not include measures to address hostile attacks, Annex A, 
Guide to the Naval Ship Code, describes how required survivability should be defined 
as a result of the specific operation profile of the ship. The annex states that potential 
damage caused by hostile acts, post-damage ship capability requirements and a 
philosophy for recovery from the damaged state must be defined for effective 
application of the code. This should be defined as scenarios in the ship’s concept of 
operation and the code also states that policies and doctrines should be made available 
so that staff involved in design as well as operation can understand the basis for 
decisions. 
In theory, the goal-based approach of the NSC permits alternative arrangements, but 
the choice of verification method often reduces that freedom substantially. It is 
therefore very important to choose a verification method that is suitable for the type of 
ship and concept of operation in question. The goals in the NSC are not risk-based. 
However, a risk-based verification method is not contradictory to the definition of 
performance-based verification. See Paper II for further details. 
Paper I studies two cases, ballistic protection on smaller naval vessels and bridge 
configuration to minimize the effects of an attack, and shows that the NSC does not 
give any insight into how a quantitative analysis of the ships’ survivability can, for 
example, be compared to a probabilistic analysis, in accordance with the classification 
rules. The NSC states that survivability should be analysed using defined scenarios in 
the ships’ concept of operation. However, this is not possible without a common base 
for probabilities and the NSC does not specify that probabilities should be defined for 
the scenarios in the concept of operation. This means that defining a method for 
assessing probabilities of armed attack and its consequences is needed to allow 
integrated survivability and safety analyses for naval ships. 
4.3 Current research and developments in maritime security 
As described above, when it was introduced in 2002, the ISPS code was described as a 
first step. However, development since the code was introduced has been limited. In a 
review of recent literature concerning maritime security, Yang found 30 relevant 
research papers, of which only 10 are quantitative and none has a risk management 
perspective (Yang, 2011). 
There are, however, a few papers on ship security relating to piracy. Two typical 
examples of such papers are Is piracy random? by Mejia et al. (2009) and Risk 
modelling of non-lethal response to maritime piracy and estimating its effect by Psarros 
et al. (2011). Both these papers use statistics on piracy incidents and on the world 
merchant fleet to analyse the risk of piracy. The use of statistics, however, limits the 
description of the causes, or risk drivers, resulting in the analysed risk. These papers 
show, therefore, that there is a need for more thorough threat analysis in order to 
explain causes and predict future risks. 
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In both the UK and NATO doctrines, the method for understanding the threat is well 
defined (DCDC, 2010 and NATO Standardization Agency, 2007). However, the 
method for the suggested risk analysis is only described on a general level. Therefore 
the military development is more developed in regards to threat analysis in comparison 
to civilian maritime security, but in regards to methods for risk analysis both the 
civilian and military development in maritime security lack the structured and 
documented perspective found in maritime safety. This supports the need for 
combining civilian and military experience discussed in section 1.1. 
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5 Maritime risk management, today’s methods and tools 
This chapter presents central, and generic, concepts and methods used in maritime risk 
management today. These concepts and methods are also utilized in the approach for 
ship security presented here. 
5.1 Risk criteria and risk control options 
Both civilian and military ship owners are responsible for weighing the risk against the 
cost of implementing controls and measures and the impact on operational gain. 
However, other organizations and society also set limitations on permitted risks and 
risk criteria. Risk criteria have been discussed within the IMO because of risk-based 
safety approaches (Skjong, 2009). 
According to Pedersen different principles must be used to formulate risk criteria 
depending on the form of the consequence; the appropriate principles and levels are 
different for situations involving individual fatality compared to accidents involving 
multiple fatalities or environmental consequences. There must be particular focus on 
accidents with multiple fatalities because society is more concerned about single events 
with many fatalities and societal risk, than it is about several incidents with few 
fatalities per incident (Pedersen, 2010). Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the 
risks associated with ship security, such as example piracy, other types of crime at sea 
and attack against military ships, need specific risk criteria, as the consequence is not 
comparable with traditional operational risks for shipping. For further discussion on 
risk criteria and ship security, see Papers II and III. 
Risk criteria within IMO are often formulated in the form of a diagram where the risk 
criteria limits the combination of the cumulative frequency (F) and number of persons 
harmed (N), in a F-N diagram as shown in Figure 6. Risk in the Non-Acceptable 
domain, for example an activity were 10 persons is expected to be killed every 100 
years, must be reduced at all costs. For risks in the As low as reasonable possible 
(ALARP) domain, for example an event where 100 people are expected to be killed 
every 10,000 years, the effectiveness of safety measures should be considered alongside 
other criteria, e.g. finance. IMO and IACS will only introduce or propose new risk 
reducing measures, if the resultant cost of a new measure is less than three million 
USD per potential life saved (Pedersen, 2010 and Skjong, 2009). 
 
Figure 6. Typical risk acceptance criterion, F-N diagram. Redrawn from Pedersen 
(2010). 
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Relevant and well-defined risk criteria are a prerequisite for risk analysis because the 
analysis must assess the type of consequences relevant for the risk criteria. Risk control 
options (means of controlling the risk) are applied for risks in the Non-Acceptable and 
ALARP domains. Risk control options can range from technical measures included in 
the design of the ship to specific changes to such things as the watch-keeping scheme 
on board. Typical and recommended risk control options are described in IMO 
regulations and classification requirements. 
Typical security control options are also described in the ISPS code (IMO, 2002a) and 
the Best Management Practise for Protection against Somalia Based Piracy (BMP) 
(BIMCO, et al., 2011). However, each security threat and ship has specific risk 
causality and, therefore, a specific list of suitable risk control options. These control 
options can only be found with the help of a ship-specific risk-based ship security 
assessment (IMO, 2002a). 
5.2 Probabilistic risk assessment 
Probabilistic risk assessment offers a sound and systematic basis for evaluating 
potential hazardous activity. Risk analysis is a tool for identifying and assessing 
possible unwanted events and finding effective measures to minimise the risk. 
However, the methods used are specialized and often complex and an audit of the 
assessment is vital to ensure a logical and consistent approach and that relevant data 
has been adopted (Andrews & Moss, 2002). 
The first step of the risk analysis is the scope and system definition. The system 
definition will always affect the validity and outcome of the analysis, but a clear and 
sound definition is also a requirement for effective analysis. Therefore, the definition 
of the system must be thoroughly documented and presented with the results of the 
analysis (Hansson, 2012). 
5.2.1 Hazard and scenario identification 
In the identification of hazards step, both creative and analytical techniques are used. 
The “what can go wrong” question must be explored systematically, usually based on 
expert judgment; see (Kuo, 2007 and IMO, 2002b). 
Risk scenarios must be based on the hazards identified. The scenarios should have 
calculable probability and consequences that are able to collectively quantify the life-
cycle risk of a ship at sea. They relate to event categories with major hazard potential. 
When generic scenarios are available, they must be adapted and customised to the 
specific design features and expected performance of the ship in question. 
5.2.2 Analysis of consequences and probabilities 
After hazard identification and scenario definition, the scenarios must be analysed in 
detail in order to estimate the risk. The purpose of this analysis is to investigate the 
consequences of the identified hazards and to calculate their probabilities. This is a 
complex procedure and the criteria discussed in section 2.1 must be taken into account 
throughout the analysis. 
In the analysis, low-level factors, such as engineering specifications, system schematics 
and measured or assessed probabilities, are linked to the probability of the identified 
consequences. For this analysis there are several tools documented in risk analysis 
17 
literature. However, each tool has specific limitations and benefits and the analysis 
process has to be chosen carefully. The analysis can, for example, be carried out using a 
combination of event trees, influence diagrams and Monte Carlo simulations as in 
Paper III. 
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6 Summary of the work in the appended papers 
The work in the appended Papers I to III is related to the risk management process for 
ships, but for different kinds of systems and with different scope and methods, as 
outlined in Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9. Illustration of the risk management process and the scope and methods for 
Paper I, Paper II and Paper III. 
6.1 Paper I 
The aim of Paper I is to investigate and describe the effects of the NSC on efforts to 
enhance ship survivability. The study is a qualitative case study with two cases: ballistic 
protection of smaller naval vessels and bridge configuration to minimize effects of 
attacks. The two cases are chosen so that they cover a range of requirement types. In 
these two areas, the NSC regulations (i.e. the aims, goals, functional areas, 
performance requirements and verification methods) are compared to survivability 
measures. The result is discussed in terms of how the NSC affects total safety efforts. 
The NSC is compared with the types of measures called for in the two cases in order to 
see how the code interacts with measures to increase ships’ survivability. The three 
basic areas of safety culture; (a) formal regulations and processes, (b) competence and 
training and (c) shared risk awareness throughout the organisation, were used to 
structure the analysis and the results in Paper I. The first area, formal regulations, is 
analysed for each case separately and the two other areas are analysed for the two 
cases together. 
Paper I, therefore, unveils the imbalance between safety and security and examines the 
demands on the security risk management process in relation to a ship’s survivability. 
Paper I concludes that in order to be able to include survivability, or ship security, in 
the understanding of the overall performance of a ship, a risk knowledge model that 
includes safety and security is needed. 
6.2 Paper II 
In Paper II probabilistic risk assessment is used as a method to quantify safety and 
security. The aim is to investigate and describe how, based on probabilistic risk 
assessment procedure, the concept of operation for a ship can be turned into relevant 
safety scenarios. It should be possible to use such scenarios in the evaluation of 
consequences and probabilities as a decision support tool in the design of naval ships. 
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Aspects of safety culture, codes, regulations and rules are analysed in terms of the 
requirements of safety scenarios. The analysis focuses on requirements, which ensure 
that the result can be used to improve the design process and enhance design decision 
making. Military operational research, specifically on modelling military systems, is 
described in order to ensure that safety scenarios model military operations effectively.  
Safety scenarios for commercial ships are often based on accident statistics combined 
with expert judgment, but for military operations, statistical data is rare. The paper 
presents an example of a numerical simulation for event probability estimation. It 
demonstrates how probability-based scenarios can be derived, based on the 
requirements discussed in the previous sections of this thesis. The objective of the 
model is to use the concept of operation to identify scenarios that relate to accident 
categories with major hazard potential and to assess the scenario probability. The 
model is a formalised procedure of incident quantification to support definition of 
probability-based safety scenarios. The resulting scenarios could then be used in risk 
analysis. 
The inputs to the simulation model are typical design parameters such as ship speed, 
sensor characteristics and intended fleet composition. Based on the concept of 
operation, the relevant types of naval operation are divided into tactical tasks defined 
with measures of effectiveness, environmental data and threat characteristics. These 
kinds of simulations are in their structure and model characteristics not new, but the 
results here must be aggregated and handled so that they are consistent with 
probabilistic risk assessment. 
The study shows that simulation of tactical tasks makes it possible to quantify and 
analyse the operation procedures and system configurations in relation to scenario 
probability. Simulation, therefore, supports scenario definition based on a combination 
of simulation output and expert judgment. The simulation will then illustrate the causal 
relationships that link the characteristics of the ship to the operational risks, for 
example, see Figure 9, where the cumulative frequency of available time for counter 
measures is calculated for different situations. 
 
Figure 9. Cumulative frequency of available time for counter measure. 1,000,000 
simulated events. From the figure, it is clear that the combination of end of watch and 
waves combine to reduce the available time, and by how much. 
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The output from scenario simulations will therefore guide experts to more ship-specific 
probability functions than would have been the case, if the experts had based safety 
scenarios on experience alone. The simulation can, therefore, assist in a process that 
otherwise relied completely on expert judgment. 
6.3 Paper III 
In Paper III the ship security assessment of the ISPS code is reviewed with a wider 
perspective making use of security research and experience from military force 
protection, and methodological lessons learned from maritime probabilistic risk 
assessment. The study has two main objectives: to explore the possibilities and carry 
out quantified and more thorough ship security risk analysis than that described in the 
ISPS code and the guidelines to the code, and to examine and evaluate to what extent 
this more detailed analysis increases ship security. 
The study focuses on the Somali based maritime piracy using the piracy on the Indian 
Ocean as the example case. Data is collected, using questionnaires and interviews, 
from civilian and military security experts with firsthand experience from piracy off the 
coast of Somalia. The data is specifically collected for this study and describes the 
threat capability, threat intent and the likelihood of exploiting the ships’ vulnerability. 
The data collection is performed in three different steps. In the first step a 
questionnaire was sent to experts in order to collect data on the piracy operating out of 
Somalia. The second step was interviews with experts to collect a wider knowledge 
base on piracy and the risk management performed by ship owners and operators. In 
the third step selected areas of piracy were revisited using a second questionnaire in 
order to decrease the range of the uncertainties in the answers. 
Event tree methodology is used to model and analyse the possible consequences and 
the probabilities of an attack. The inductive event tree is used because a pirate attack 
has well defined chronological steps that are illustrated by the sequences of the event 
tree. Collected data is used to develop models and calculate probabilities for the event 
tree. The calculations are simulations representing sub sets of the scenario with 
influences according to influence diagrams. Throughout the analysis the results of the 
influence analysis play an important role in describing the interaction between pirates’ 
characteristics and ships’ vulnerability. See Figures 10, 11 and 12. 
 
Figure 10. Quantitative output from the Monte Carlo simulations in Paper III in the 
form of calculated probability of successful approach as a function of ship speed and 
skiff detection distance. 
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Figure 11. Quantitative output from the analytic probability calculations in Paper III in 
the form of calculated probability density function for pirate search groups on the 
Indian Ocean.  
 
Figure 12. Influence diagram for assessing and comparing probability of successful 
boarding. 
According to the interviews conducted, the combination of graphical illustration and 
quantitative output not only calculates probabilities and consequence, it also enables a 
qualitative discussion on causes and measures not possible with the qualitative analysis 
often performed today. In the areas where it is possible to compare the calculation 
results of the performed analysis with incidents reports the result of the study is inside 
the event space of the statistics and can therefore be assumed to model the relevant 
aspects of the threat, see for example Figure 10.  
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7 Conclusions  
The overall conclusion is that the proposed method brings the procedure and results of 
ship security analysis into the open and therefore allows for criticism, improvements 
and shared risk knowledge, not possible with less structured methods. The proposed 
method, therefore, enable a discussion on probabilities and facilitate feedback to 
experts on their assessment which will lead to better assessments in the future 
(Hansson, 2012). Below the conclusions are divided into two categories: scientific 
contributions, and industrial relevance and findings. 
Scientific contributions 
It has been found that risk analysis for a naval ship should include events that follow an 
armed attack so that redundancy, for example, is not only based on safety measures 
derived from civilian shipping scenarios. It is, therefore, concluded that a method for 
assessing probabilities of armed attack and its consequences is needed in order to allow 
integrated survivability and safety analysis for naval ships. 
It has been shown that the scenarios modelled in the analysis must have calculable 
probability, be adapted and customised to the specific design features and expected 
performance of the vessel in question with an emphasis on disaster escalation 
scenarios. Results from simulations show that modelling tactical tasks in military 
operations is a possible way of supporting experts in the definition of probability based 
security scenarios. 
It is further concluded that influence diagrams facilitate the use of a combination of 
quantified data and qualitative descriptions to analyse the threat and that the 
calculated probabilities agree with the frequencies in the incident reports. The 
scenarios developed are found to describe the most important influences in the areas 
analysed, see for example Figure 10. 
An understanding of the causal relationship between threat and risk, gained from the 
risk-based approach with structurally collected and documented information on the 
threat, is important in order to effectively select robust risk control options. This is 
because such an understanding allows examination of how the different risk control 
options contribute to security. This understanding and examination can then be used to 
design the optimal risk control option for a specific ship, which gives high security 
without any unnecessary negative impact on operations. 
Industrial relevance and findings 
It is concluded that the use of probabilistic safety scenarios supports risk analysis of 
both traditional maritime safety areas as well as military survivability areas and the key 
aspects of safety culture throughout the design, construction and operation of the ship. 
Such scenarios were found to give an insight into how quantitative analysis of a ship’s 
survivability can, for example, be compared to a probabilistic analysis in accordance 
with the classification rules. 
This study shows that it is possible with, the use of experts, to collect data on a pirate’s 
capability, intent and likelihood of exploiting vulnerability through a combination of 
questionnaires and interviews. 
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The interviews show that the combination of graphical illustration and quantitative 
output in the analysis method used, influence diagrams based on qualitative 
descriptions and quantitative data, not only calculates probabilities, it also enables a 
qualitative discussion on causes and measures not possible with the qualitative analysis 
often performed today. Such a discussion is very valuable in the decision process. 
However, it is also clear from the interviews that the proposed method demands more 
work than that put in to ship security analysis today.  
25 
8 Future work 
Existing research in the area of quantitative ship security risk analysis is very limited. 
Much more is needed in order to develop reliable methods that can be applied 
generally. Papers II and III, however, show that it is reasonable to assume that the 
approach is feasible and can already give important input to the risk analysis process 
when discussing such issues as anti- piracy measures on ships. The aim in coming years 
therefore, based on the current results, is to deepen the analysis completed so far, in 
order to be able to verify the results and validate the proposed method more 
thoroughly. 
As mentioned in section 3, quantitative risk assessment offers a sound and systematic 
basis for evaluating potential hazardous activity, but is specialized and often complex 
and an audit of the assessment is vital to ensure a logical and consistent approach and 
that relevant data has been adopted (Andrews & Moss, 2002). 
Despite a lack of historical data and realistic experiments, as discussed earlier, future 
studies must be performed to further verify the calculations of both probabilities and 
consequences and to further validate the results of the risk analysis. Three different 
principal approaches to such a verification and validation are briefly discussed below. 
Theoretical method development 
Due to the immaturity of the field and limited availability of data, future work should 
focus on theoretical method development. In order to cover all aspects of risk analysis, 
the work is to be divided into several small areas and, for each of these areas, the 
results are to be both verified and validated on simplified base cases where data is 
available or obtainable. 
Focus areas for theoretical method development could include, but not be limited to, 
the following: 
- tools for developing and validating probability based security scenarios, 
- reliability and calibration of expert assessment for ship security analysis, and 
- development of ship security simulations and verification methods. 
Such studies would be able to give specific recommendations on how these activities 
should be planned, performed and used in ship risk management. 
Applied method development on naval ships 
For naval ships the connection between security risks and the concept of operation of 
the ship is specifically strong. This puts the focus on validity of the risk analysis in 
relation to the ship’s measures of effectiveness. Without such validity the risk analysis 
is pointless. Studies of naval ships are, therefore, important for establishing an 
understanding of the utility of security risk analysis.  
Studies of naval ships could give unique insight to: 
- how a safety culture of calculated risk taking can utilize risk analysis, and  
- how, and to what extent, the analysis should be performed in order to make the 
analysis useful. 
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Applied method development on civilian ships 
Ship specific analyses are important because the detail of such studies will introduce 
problems not encountered in the more general studies performed so far. For civilian 
ships there are statistics and incident reports available to study and, based on the 
experience from Paper III, it can be assumed that for limited cases it is possible to 
perform a detailed security analysis and also verify and validate the result. These 
studies could be performed on: 
- piracy in different regions, and testing how accurately the model can describe 
how the risk is affected by the threats intent and modus operandi, and 
- terrorist attacks, and examining how the conceptually different intent (terror) 
changes the conditions for analysis. 
Studies of civilian ships also allow study of which results should be presented, and how 
they should be presented, in risk evaluation and risk reduction in order to create 
effective risk management. 
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